The court found no waiver 25 and sustained the assertion of the privilege. Flack responded that the privilege had been waived because the conversation had taken place in the presence of a third person (White). Godlewski asserted the attorney-client privilege. “ ‘Ray said he talked to Gene grandmother this morning and she said not to have someone else go down for something they didn't do.’ ” “ ‘The attorney then said, ‘You got yourself in deeper trouble and are going to have to straighten it out.’ That's what I'm going to tell them, that I did it, not these guys.’ “The statement by the witness was that he heard the attorney say ‘You would have been better off saying that you did it instead of blaming it on these guys. Instead, he read it to the court as follows: Flack did not offer the statement into evidence. White apparently signed the statement under penalty of perjury. Flack's offer of proof consisted of a written statement prepared by Flack's investigator, who had spoken with White. Flack proposed to call as a witness Steve White, a county jail inmate, who allegedly overheard a conversation between Godlewski and his lawyer in the “lockup” on the day of Godlewski's arraignment in the superior court. Flack characterizes the statements as an admission by Godlewski that he (Godlewski), not Flack, actually committed the murder.
Review flack automatic email sender trial#
The Trial Court Properly Excluded Statements Godlewski Made to His Lawyerįlack contends that prejudicial error occurred because the trial court ruled inadmissible, based upon the attorney-client privilege, statements made by Godlewski to his lawyer. (The special circumstance allegation against Brown had been stricken before trial at the request of the People.) ** The jury disagreed and found him guilty of first degree murder. Essentially, he argued that the People's circumstantial evidence case against him did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury disbelieved Flack and found him guilty of first degree murder and found true the special circumstance allegation of murder for financial gain.īrown did not testify and presented no defense. Flack claimed that it was Godlewski who actually shot the victim. He admitted only that he had purchased a shotgun for Godlewski. The jury apparently credited Godlewski's claim to a certain extent because, although charged with first degree murder with the special circumstance allegation of murder for financial gain, he was convicted only of second degree murder.įlack testified and denied having committed the murder. Additionally, he claimed he was fearful of his father because of threats he had made shortly before his death. He asserted that he had done so because of a lifetime of physical and emotional abuse suffered at his father's hands. Godlewski testified and admitted hiring Flack to kill his father. At certain points, each jury was excluded during portions of the People's case although both juries heard all of the defense evidence. However, one jury was impanelled for Brown and Flack while another jury was impanelled for Godlewski. The three men were jointly charged and tried. Flack fled to Louisiana but was soon apprehended. Several days later, the police arrested Godlewski and Brown. The police interviewed Flack and Brown but released them. On July 5, 1989, Flack told Paul Caines that he had committed the murder. When the victim answered, Flack murdered him with a single shotgun blast to the head. on July 4, 1989, Brown drove Flack to the victim's home in Sylmar. Flack enlisted Michael Brown's assistance. Godlewski, desiring to kill his father, hired Gene Flack to commit the crime. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary to evaluate the specific assignments of error. 431, 606 P.2d 738), the operative events of this murder-for-hire case. As none of the defendants directly raises a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we will briefly summarize, in accord with the traditional rule of appellate review (People v. Three defendants appeal following their convictions for murder. Fischer, Santa Monica, for defendants and appellants. Stephen Temko and Christopher Blake, San Diego, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, and Dennis A. GODLEWSKI et al., Defendants and Appellants. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.